Abstract. Group key management plays an important role in ensuring the safety and reliability of the VANET (vehicular ad-hoc network) over the channel. Through considering the characteristics of VANET communication and topology, a VANET group key management scheme is proposed based on random transmission which is combined with the construction of polynomial and key updating by Hash chain. The scheme achieves the random transmission function of group key and the node revocation capability. Moreover, it can ensure the forward and backward and other security attributes of the group key. The results show that the proposed scheme has less communication complexity and better communication performance, also it can suitable for large scale VANET group.
Fig 1. Process of group key management scheme

System Initialization
The symbol definition is given out of the scheme shown in Table 1 . Vehicle node V i accesses network, registers and applies for Cert(V i ) from CA (Certificate Authority). After the application has been approved by CA, the ( 
Group Key Exchange
In this section, group key exchange is based on the mBPR model [5] . Assuming that the private and public key of GM s are ( , | mod )
, the private and public key of V i are ( , | mod )
In this formula, gcd( , 
Group Key Generation
Group key generation is based on the mKY model [5] . V i selects a random x i as private key, so the public key is mod
The process of setting up the current group key is as follows:
(2) At the same time, V i receives
Otherwise, end computational process.
Key Distribution Based on Random Transmission
represents the nodes which are to be distributed in circle T.
We use T S
K to distribute the key data based on constructing polynomial.
(1) GM s queries the collection 1 2 { , , ,
and constructs the polynomial in finite field q F :
.Expanding the polynomial based on congruence of number theory:
In this formula, 1 2
is according to the specific key factor parameters to calculate.
List receives M T and constructs the polynomial by the same coefficient:
from Group s . The process of key distribution based on constructing polynomial shown in Figure 2 . 
Group Key Update
The process of key data update based on Hash chain shown in Figure 3 . 
Scheme Safety and Performance Analysis
Safety Analysis
In this scheme, group key exchange and generation has already been proved in security based on mBPR [6] model and mKY [6] security model. The node has not exchanged key factor with GM s can't compute key data. Any node V i can compute i s k with a non-ignorable probability ε , it also can solve high order polynomial problem of Ruffini Abel theorem or large number factorization problem with a non-ignorable probability. So the security of group key is guaranteed.
The described key updating mechanism in this scheme is based on Hash chain. Hash has the features of unidirectional and resistance to strong collision. Any node has got key data in circle T seq wants to get the key data in its last circle T seq-1 is infeasible. In other words, the process of computing a last node from a current node in Hash chain is not feasible in the calculation.
When vehicle nodes leave group in circle T seq , GM s uses the private key to computes message authentication code and tags the key data as abolished. Any node left the group can't get t L K by updating. While GM s redistributes key data based on constructing polynomial, there is no key factor of the node left the group, so it can't recover the key data from the broadcast. Therefore, our scheme can effectively satisfied the forward and backward of the group key in this scheme. Table 2 . Overhead of establishing group key 
Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare LKH [6] agreement base on logic key tree, TR-GKA [5] agreement and LMA [7] scheme which is similar in structure with this paper. We take the overall number of communication rounds and the calculation of a single node as the main reference.
Assuming that n is the number of group member nodes, m is the number of nodes participated in group key data negotiation. MUL represents point multiplication of elliptic curve, B is global broadcast, U is unicast communication of point to point, EXP is modular exponentiation, Hash represents one-way Hash operation, MAC is message authentication code operation, sig is digital signature, vsig is validate of digital signature, random is random communication process. The overhead of establishing group key in communication, calculation and storage shown in Table 2 .
From table 2, it is clear that our scheme has larger calculation than LMA agreement, GM needs polynomial times multiplication, one time digital signature. V i has the same scale in calculation with TR-GKA agreement needs modular exponential operation. In storage aspect, our scheme is better than LKH agreement and TR-GKA agreement, and at the same level with LMA agreement. It has the same scale with other schemes in communication performance.
When there are vehicle nodes joined or left the group, the key update mode is different from key establishment phase. Overhead of key update by joining notes into the group or revoking notes out of the group shown in Table 3 and 4. From table 3 and 4, our scheme has better performance than other schemes in communication. And when nodes join into the group, our scheme is superior to others in calculation. But when nodes left the group, members that did not leave the group using the method of redistribution in our scheme. So it is more complex than other schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, our scheme based on random transmission is better reflected in safety and communication performance. The key path is depth random of this scheme. When the number of group members increases linearly, the frequency of the communication will grow exponentially in distributed group key management. But communication times still appeared linear growth in our scheme. And propagation delay time is logarithmic growth. Under ideal circumstances, the number of nodes in a single cycle will be exponential growth in this paper. That means group key can quickly cover the key data and be applied to large scale VANET communication requirements.
